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Galileo, Biotechnology, and
Epistemological Humility:
Moving stewardship beyond the
development-conservation debate

by Charles C. Adams

ABSTRACT
Modern technology—biotechnology in particular—confronts the Christian community
with a plethora of complex issues and questions
for which there are no simple answers. Some of
those issues—stem cell research, for example—are
relatively speciﬁc and immediate. Others are more
hypothetical: genetic therapy for lengthening lifespan is one example. One particular issue that is
both theoretical and immediate is the question of
Dr. Charles C. Adams is Professor of Engineering and
Dean of the Natural Sciences at Dordt College.

stewardship. What does the Lord require of his
image-bearing creatures with respect to their relationship to the rest of creation? Some Christians
have argued that we are called by God to respect
and conserve the created order and that we do so
by seeking ecological understanding and promoting actions that minimize human disruption of
and/or intervention in those ecological patterns
that we discover. Other Christians, hearing God’s
call to “be fruitful and increase in number, ﬁll the
earth and subdue it,” understand stewardship more
in terms of development. The former group raise
many concerns with respect to biotechnology. The
latter group are eager to promote biotechnological
advancement. Far too often, however, representatives of both groups are inﬂuenced by naturalism as
much as by careful biblical thinking.
Using a relatively novel interdisciplinary approach, this paper will advocate for the embrace of
epistemological humility as a way of avoiding the
pitfalls of naturalistic thinking and for remaining
faithful to traditional Christian understandings of
the nature of creation and of what it means to be
human. Starting with basic biblical tenets that have
been accepted by Christians for centuries, it will seek
to articulate a relationship between the human and
non-human creation that encourages careful biotechnological advance within the context of creation
care, and that transcends the polarization between
unbridled development and stagnating conservation.
The approach will incorporate insights from the history of science (e.g., Galileo, Descartes) and the phiPro Rege—March 2007
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losophy of technology (e.g., Egbert Schuurman) with
basic Christian doctrine (e.g., the Apostle’s Creed) to
imply a posture of epistemological humility suitable
as a common foundation from which to approach
speciﬁc issues and problems in biotechnology.
INTRODUCTION
Because of this the land mourns, and all who live
in it waste away; the beasts of the ﬁeld and the
birds of the air and the ﬁsh of the sea are dying.
(Hosea 4:3, NIV )
You will go out in joy and be led forth in peace;
the mountains and hills will burst into song before
you, and all the trees of the ﬁeld will clap their
hands. (Isaiah 55:10-12, NIV )

The words of Hosea and Isaiah bring critical understanding to what we read in the Psalms (e.g., Psalm
8, 19, 24) and in the book of Genesis (Genesis 1 and
2): the earth, all of creation, belongs to God. He
loves it and cares for it; but his image-bearing creature has sinned and brought shame and brokenness
upon that creation. Nonetheless, by God’s grace the
whole of creation will be redeemed. Humankind
and mountains, the beasts and the trees of the ﬁeld
alike, will share in the eternal reconciliation bought
by the suffering of the Redeemer, the one revealed
in the New Testament as Jesus, the Word of God in
human form, the Creator-Sustainer-Redeemer of all
things (Colossians 1:15-20).
In these last days, before the return of Jesus,
we humans experience both the brokenness described by Hosea and the shalom foreseen by Isaiah.
Moreover, we are called to serve as God’s hands in
his world: the instruments through which he brings
healing and reconciliation to his creation. At the
beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, we ﬁnd ourselves having learned how to transform creation in
ways unimagined by the Old Testament prophets.
In particular, the most recent advances in biotechnology have enabled humankind to wield unimagined power, power that can bring both great healing and great devastation upon creation, including
humankind itself.
Getting in Bed with Frankenstein
Agriculture deﬁnes northwest Iowa. Sioux
2

Pro Rege—March 2007

Center, located on the plains of northwest Iowa, is
surrounded by ﬁelds of corn and soybeans, punctuated by hog and cattle feedlots. However, agriculture is changing. The corn has been genetically
modiﬁed to resist herbicides, and the reproduction
of cattle is gaining assistance from artiﬁcial insemination and cloning. Even so, a newcomer has
been added to the northwest Iowa landscape: the
biotechnology company. By 2002, there were no
less than seven biotechnology companies operating
in northwest Iowa, and increasingly, Dordt College
graduates—with majors in chemistry, biology, and
agriculture—were ﬁlling their professional ranks.
With this newcomer, it seemed natural and appropriate to some at Dordt College that a program
in biotechnology be established. What was envisioned was not a full-blown research and teaching
program that would compete with the likes of Iowa
State University but rather a modest undergraduate
program, one that would more completely prepare
students for service in the ﬁeld of biotechnology,
both in terms of technical competence and—more
importantly—Christian perspective.
However, what seemed natural and appropriate
to some, struck horror in the minds of others. Dordt
College has had a program in environmental studies for a decade or more, originating in its Biology
Department and eventually becoming a major in
its own right. The quarter-century-old Agriculture
Program has always held a reputation for promoting sustainability and creation care. As a result, a
number of Dordt life scientists (agronomists, biologists, environmental scientists, etc.) raised serious
questions about the appropriateness of starting a
biotechnology program. To them, it was inconsistent for an institution devoted to “serviceable insight,” “care for creation,” and “obedient stewardship” to promote a ﬁeld of inquiry/endeavor that
they perceived to be hubris-motivated, unstewardly,
dangerous in the extreme, “playing God” (whatever
that might mean), and contemptuous of creation.
Joining the life scientists were a number of philosophers who believed that before any such program
is started, those starting it must demonstrate its
expertise with respect to such philosophy-of- biotechnology issues as safety and risk, bioethics, and
transgenic manipulation.
Under that directive, a “biotechnology working

group” was formed to investigate the outstanding
issues and to propose a program that would assuage
the critics and give form to the vision of those who
believed that Dordt had a high calling to start a biotechnology program. Before the formal proposal to
start the program was adopted in May of 2006, the
group had produced a ﬁfty-four page position paper

Throughout the process,
however, it became clear
that the central issue of
debate was the tension
between a view of
stewardship as conserving,
caring for, and serving the
non-human creation, and
a view of stewardship as
unfolding, developing, and
serving the non-human
creation.
titled Getting in Bed with Frankenstein: Why a Christian
College Should Develop Programs in Biotechnolog y,1 providing a biblically based rationale for the program
and addressing some of the most contentious issues. Throughout the process, however, it became
clear that the central issue of debate was the tension
between a view of stewardship as conserving, caring for, and serving the non-human creation, and a
view of stewardship as unfolding, developing, and
serving the non-human creation.
Stewardship as Conserving or Stewardship as
Development: An “Either/Or”?
The position paper prepared by the Biotechnology Working Group laid the groundwork for
and brieﬂy addressed such issues as sustainable
agriculture, safety and risk, distributive justice, genetically modiﬁed crops and the developing world,

transgenic manipulation and the boundaries of
“kinds,” the sanctity of life and of human life, cloning, and the nature of human nature. Ultimately,
it was found that each of these issues, as well as
the question of development versus conservation,
is grounded in just a few more fundamental issues.
Those turn out to be (1) the deﬁnition of biotechnology, (2) humanity’s fall into sin and the scope
of the consequent curse, and (3) the relation of humanity to the non-human creation.
DEFINING BIOTECHNOLOGY
The ﬁrst question is whether a narrow or broad
deﬁnition of biotechnology is appropriate. To some,
the word “biotechnology” is synonymous with “genetic engineering” and is irrevocably tied to transgenic manipulation and cloning. Such a deﬁnition
is unhelpful for a number of reasons. First, it begs
the question by deﬁning a human activity in terms
of particular forms of that activity—forms that are
at the heart of the controversy. Second, and more
important, it fails to allow for a careful analysis of
the context of meaning of the activity we call biotechnology. Thereby it opens itself up to assumptions it may well want to reject.
The Working Group found that a more general deﬁnition of biotechnology allowed for a careful analysis of the various issues. In Stephen V.
Monsma’s book Responsible Technolog y, a comprehensive deﬁnition of technology is offered and carefully
explained. That deﬁnition views technology as one
kind of human response to the “creation mandate,”
the call given to humankind, in Genesis 1:28 and
2:15, to “be fruitful and increase in number; ﬁll the
earth and subdue it….Rule over the ﬁsh of the sea
and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.” According to the
deﬁnition given in Responsible Technolog y, technology involves as its subject “the natural creation.”2
The authors understand this term to mean physical and living things. Thus, it is reasonable to see
“technology” as being capable of subdivision into
two categories: the technology of physical subjects
and the technology of living subjects. This was
the approach taken by the Dordt Working Group:
Biotechnology, most simply, is the technology of
living subjects. Reﬁning the general deﬁnition of
technology given in Responsible Technolog y, the folPro Rege—March 2007

3

lowing was agreed upon:
Biotechnology is a distinct, cultural activity
in which human beings exercise freedom and are
held accountable as they respond to God by transforming the biotic creation, with the aid of tools
and procedures, for basic research and for practical ends and purposes.

THE FALL AND THE CURSE
While no one at Dordt denied the radical fall
into sin and the brokenness that has been its result,
the extent of that brokenness became an issue. If,
for example, the non-human creation is unaffected
by the fall except in terms of its direct (causal) relationships with humankind, then the order and relationships we ﬁnd within the non-human creation
might (and I stress the word “might”) be given a
kind of benchmark status in our biotechnological
work. If, on the other hand, the curse is more systemic and creation does indeed “groan” of its own
accord—even without causal interaction with sinful
humanity—then the order and relationships we observe in the non-human creation cannot with conﬁdence be used as a template for biotechnological
work. However, this issue is beyond the scope of
this paper and, to at least some extent, overlaps the
third issue: the relationship of humanity to the nonhuman creation.
HUMANKIND’S RELATION TO
THE NON-HUMAN CREATION
What is the relationship of humankind to the
non-human creation? Are humans simply one
more species of living things that, at this point in
the history of the universe, is effectuating signiﬁcant change on planet Earth but that will one day go
the way of the dinosaur? Or are humans a unique
species unlike any other kind of living creature, a
species that has the capacity to radically alter its
own environment and possibly its own nature in
unpredictable directions? Are humans a developing form of divinity? Or are humans the servants of
a deity that created the universe and made humans
his representative to serve, care for, and enable that
universe to ﬂourish? And particularly in these days
of advancing technological capability, how does our
understanding of the relationship of humans to the
4
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non-human creation inform our understanding of
technology?
Thomas Hobbes’ famous description of the
“natural condition of mankind” as “solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short” 3 only slightly exaggerates
the experience of most people in pre-modern times.
The phrase “over-against” conveys concisely the relationship of humans to the non-human creation.
Finding or producing sufﬁcient food and protection
against the weather and predators dominated that
relationship.
Civilization enabled humankind to reﬂect on
that “over-against” relationship. However, while
one might ﬁnd some appreciation for the non-human creation in the writings of Homer and of the
Old Testament,4 it was Hellenistic thought that
most deﬁnitely shaped attitudes regarding the relation of humankind and non-humankind. At the
center of that thought was Platonic idealism, with its
own particular form of “over-against.” The nonhuman creation was viewed as imperfect and temporal matter, lacking substance and permanence,
a mere shadow (to use Plato’s analogy) of the ideal
and eternal forms that could only be approached by
thought. The truly human part of humankind was
that thinking apparatus or mind
mind. The human body
was separate from that mind, merely part of the insubstantial and impermanent non-human creation.
As an unhappy result, much of Christian thought
has been inﬂuenced by Hellenistic idealism. Where
the New Testament spoke of “spirit” or “soul,” the
Church understood the immaterial, rational, and
eternal essence of humankind. Where the New
Testament spoke of “body,” the Church understood
corrupt, sinful, and impermanent matter. The escape of the Christian’s soul from the body and into
“heaven” paralleled the escape of the Hellenistic
“rational soul” from the prison of the body into the
world of forms. Clearly the relationship of humankind to the non-human creation remained one of
“over against” in much of Christian thought.
It was a synthesis of Greek and Christian thought
that dominated Western culture from the early
Middle Ages to the time of the Renaissance and the
Enlightenment: biblical theology and Aristotelian
cosmology inﬂuenced each other and provided the
foundation for the Western medieval worldview.
On that foundation the Copernican Revolution in

science arose, as did the Protestant Reformation.
These and other Renaissance and Enlightenment
developments altered the way humankind viewed
the non-human creation. The rise of empiricism in
science indicates a very different way of looking at
the world around us, one that, one might say, gives
it more respect than was given during the Middle
Ages, when an understanding of the universe was
based on what might be derived, in strictly rational manner, from incidental experience and age-old
cosmological beliefs. However, even if the non-human creation was respected as a source of valuable
data, it was still viewed as “over-against” human
thought and understanding. The dualism of soul
and body remained pervasive.
Consequently, the age of exploration and the
Industrial Revolution built upon an altered foundation: one still grounded in the synthesis of Greek
thought and Christian theology but now with
the beneﬁt of pilings driven by the Copernican
Revolution in science. The sciences of mechanics
and thermodynamics made possible the development of new machines and structures, such as the
steam engine and the railroad. However, that development came only after considerable human effort.
The non-human creation continued to resist humankind’s attempt to know her and to bring forth
her artifactual children. Thus, both the science
and the technology of the period we know as the
Industrial Revolution reinforced the “over-against”
view of the relationship between the human and the
non-human creation.
The seeds of change in this view were planted
by Darwin, but they did not begin to sprout until
the late twentieth century. The idea that humankind was nothing but another expression of the
immutable and inviolable laws of nature—or even
more speciﬁcally, the laws of mechanics—was expressed by a few, most notably the French mathematician and astronomer Pierre Laplace. However,
mechanical reductionism remained too much a violation of common sense to gain signiﬁcant popularity. Darwin’s work replaced mechanical reductionism with biotic reductionism, a view that appealed
a bit more to common sense. After all, there are
more commonalities between humans and chimpanzees than there are between humans and stars
or between humans and water molecules. The late

nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century, therefore, witnessed a change in attitude regarding the relationship of the human to the nonhuman creation. Increasingly, humans were seen
as a uniquely evolved part of the natural creation.
Then the 1960s occurred, and the notion of humans
as simply a natural part of the natural creation was
dealt an enigmatic blow. It became clear to more
than just professional ecologists that humans were
causing all sorts of problems in the non-human
environment. The science of ecology arose from
obscurity to address one of the chief issues of the

It was a synthesis of Greek
and Christian thought
that dominated Western
culture from the early
Middle Ages to the time of
the Renaissance and the
Enlightenment: biblical
theology and Aristotelian
cosmology influenced each
other and provided the
foundation for the Western
medieval worldview.
day: the environmental crisis. As a result of all these
thought-changes, understanding of the relationship
between the human and the non-human creation
was obscured, with the “over-against” view gaining new strength from the palpably obvious tension
between strivings for human development and the
concern for a “clean,” or even “pristine,” environment.
THE NON-ANSWER OF NATURALISM
In some respects, naturalism may be seen as resulting from the melding of Greek and Christian
thought. Naturalism is the view, or system of
Pro Rege—March 2007
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thought, holding that all phenomena (things and
events) can be explained in terms of “natural”
causes and laws, where “natural” is understood as
that which is exclusively biotic and physical. In
many circles, the melding of Greek and Christian
thought led to a kind of deism, wherein the Creator
is understood to have brought into being all things
and the laws by which all things function, and then
simply to have allowed them to function in a seemingly autonomous fashion, with that lawfulness inherent in the things themselves. The Darwinian
variety of naturalism asserts that those laws are
fundamentally biotic and physical. The Laplacian
variety asserts that they are only physical, biotic laws
being reducible to physical law.
Of course, one need not be a deist to embrace
naturalism; an atheist can embrace naturalism just
as well. A theist can also adopt a posture of methodological naturalism; that is, one can do scientiﬁc and
technological work “as if” all things and events can
be explained in terms of natural causes and laws.
A problem with naturalism, however, is incoherence. Naturalism must begin with a belief in the
capacity of free human thought to understand and
shape the world around itself. However, when the
naturalism gets to the point of explaining all things
and events in terms of physical causality, it effectively eliminates the possibility for truly free human
thought. Thought itself becomes explainable—one
might even say determined—by the laws of physics.
The only escape for the naturalist is to posit a radically dualistic ontology: one where the world of nature and the world of free human thought are completely
separate from each other. That escape is illusory,
however, because the basic problem of how humans
are to interact with the non-human creation betrays
the inseparability of nature and free human thought
thought.
Nonetheless, a form of naturalism can be attractive to a Christian mind that sees the world in
dualistic terms: spirit and matter. It fails, however,
to address the tension between conservation and
development. A naturalist position can be used,
and has been used, to defend either side of the argument. Francis Fukuyama, for example, emphasizes
the pole of “free human thought” in his book Our
Posthuman Future; here he raises deep concern about
the ways humans are altering the natural environment. He shows particular concern for the “nature
6
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of human nature.”5 Ray Kurzweil 6 and Rodney
Brooks,7 on the other hand, emphasize the “nature pole,” explaining everything in terms of the
laws of physical causality, and thus predict the day
when there will be no difference between humans
and what we today call robots. Kurzweil, in fact,
predicts human immortality being achieved by
downloading our minds into the computer storage
devices that will be an integral part of our new and
replaceable robotic “bodies.”8
A more sophisticated form of naturalism, and
one that historically has attracted a number of
Christian thinkers, is the approach of “natural law.”
John Locke, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Aquinas
are names associated with the natural law tradition
in history. Recent work by Wesley Wildman and
by Rolf Bouma, a doctoral student of Wildman’s,
uses the approach of natural law to develop norms
for biotechnological activity. 9 While Wildman and
Bouma’s approach gives some useful guidelines by
pointing to the perceived structure of creation and
rightfully insisting that we respect that structure, it
tends to identify normativity with structure and either restricts itself to biotic and physical structures
or seeks to reduce other evidences of structure (e.g.,
parents caring for children) to biotic structure (e.g.,
evolutionary adaptation).
LESSONS FROM THE
HISTORY OF SCIENCE10
One can gain much insight into the conservation-development debate, as well as into the naturalistic perspective, by studying the history of science.
To a physical scientist, there are two key episodes
in the history of Western science that stand out as
“revolutionary:” the Copernican Revolution in the
sixteenth century and the Einsteinian Revolution in
the early twentieth century.
Prior to the Copernican Revolution—that is, prior to the discoveries represented by Copernicus and
Kepler in Astronomy and Galileo and Newton in
mechanics—Western science was dominated by the
well-established theories of Aristotle. Astronomy
was geocentric; mechanics was understood in terms
of the doctrine of “natural place,” and what was to
become chemistry was guided by the four-element
theory of matter. These were the established understandings of the physical creation, basic components

in the Western worldview for close to two-thousand
years. However, in a relatively short time during the
Sixteenth Century, that would all change. Today we
tend to look back on the theories of Aristotle as intuitive but primitive or quaint, and we neglect to
appreciate how long those theories stood the test of
time.
By the end of the nineteenth century, it seemed
that the Newtonian worldview had matured. The
revolution had been accomplished, and what was
left was to collect the data and tidy up the details.
The Industrial Revolution and developments in the
thermal-ﬂuid sciences—all based on Newtonian
physics—seemed to conﬁrm that we had arrived at
a place of scientiﬁc understanding of the universe.
However, over the course of less than twenty years,
at the beginning of the Twentieth Century the work
of Planck, Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg turned
Newtonian mechanics on its head. Today we appre-

We are much more ready
today, than we were
in Galileo or Newton’s
day, to admit that our
cosmological world picture
is as much a product of our
epistemological apparatus
as it is a picture of what is
“really and truly out there.”
ciate Newtonian science as an adequate model and
empirical explanation of the phenomena, so long as
one does not do anything extreme or look at anything too closely. Still, it is a model that fails to truly
explain the lawfulness in the physical creation.
What, then, is the cosmological model that dominates science today? What view of the world has
privileged—or as Thomas Kuhn describes it, “paradigmatic”—status? Surely it is one that is a revolutionary reﬁnement of the Newtonian worldview,
with relativity and quantum mechanics providing

that reﬁnement. However, the revolutionary work
of Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Schrödinger,
De Broglie, Born, and others—and especially the
arguments between Bohr and Einstein—have made
it clear that the cosmological picture that we have
today is as much an epistemological picture as it is
an ontological one. Whereas the Newtonian worldview was a naïve realist worldview, the post-modern cosmological picture, inﬂuenced by positivism
and linguistic analysis, exists as a tension between
realism and idealism. We are much more ready
today, than we were in Galileo or Newton’s day,
to admit that our cosmological world picture is as
much a product of our epistemological apparatus as
it is a picture of what is “really and truly out there.”
Einstein resisted that admission, wanting to believe
in a much closer relationship among the knower,
knowing, and the known subject. Neils Bohr, who
was, interestingly, known as a very humble person, embraced the uncertainty and ambiguity that
seemed required by the epistemology of quantum
mechanics. His theory of complimentarity, as well
as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, arises from a
kind of epistemological humility.
Galileo’s Epistemology
But epistemological humility has not been
a dominant characteristic of Western scientiﬁc
thought. Consider Galileo, for example. While
popular understanding limits his conﬂict with the
Church in Rome to have been primarily with the
relative position of the earth and the sun—geocentric versus heliocentric astronomical models—it
can be argued that the conﬂict was actually much
deeper, more on the level of biblical hermeneutics
and epistemology. Galileo’s views regarding Holy
Scripture and the relationship of theology to natural
science are formulated most carefully in his “Letter
to the Grand Duchess Christina.” 11 Therein one
will ﬁnd his use of the phrase, “the intention of the
Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes to heaven,
not how heaven goes.”12 Galileo’s epistemological
opinions, however, are nowhere more apparent than
in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems
Systems,
the book that caused him the greatest amount of
trouble with the Church. Consider the following
paragraph on the absolute nature of those particular modes of human understanding associated with
Pro Rege—March 2007
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mathematics and natural science:
Human understanding can be taken in two
modes, the intensive or the extensive. Extensively,
that is, with regard to the multitude of intelligibles,
which are inﬁnite, the human understanding is as
nothing even if it understands a thousand propositions; for a thousand in relation to inﬁnity is zero.
But taking man’s understanding intensively, in
so far as this term denotes understanding some
proposition perfectly, I say that the human intellect does understand some of them perfectly and
thus in these it has as much absolute certainty as
Nature itself has. Of such are the mathematical
sciences alone; that is, geometry and arithmetic, in
which the Divine intellect indeed knows inﬁnitely
more propositions, since it knows all. But with regard to those few which the human intellect does
understand, I believe that its knowledge equals the
Divine in objective certainty, for here it succeeds
in understanding necessity, beyond which there
can be no greater sureness.13

This speech is placed in the mouth of Salviati,
Galileo’s representative in the Dialogue. As if anticipating the coming fury, Galileo has Simplicio, a participant in the Dialogue
Dialogue, suggest that Salviati’s speech
strikes him “as very bold and daring.” Salviati replies that such is not the case, that his discussion
of absolute certainty is no more bold than saying
“God cannot undo what is done,” a proposition that
had some general acceptance at that time.14 Then,
to clarify his argument, Galileo has Salviati say the
following:
So in order to explain myself better, I say that
as to the truth of the knowledge which is given by
mathematical proofs, this is the same that Divine
wisdom recognizes; but I shall concede to you indeed that the way in which God knows the inﬁnite
propositions of which we know some few is exceedingly more excellent than ours. Our method
proceeds with reasoning by steps from one conclusion to another, while His is one of simple intuition.15

Galileo’s caveat notwithstanding, he is asserting
that human knowledge can be absolutely certain—
just as it is for God—and that certain kinds of human knowledge, e.g., 2 + 2 = 4, are the same for the
8
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human creature as they are for the Creator. Galileo
is recognized today as a revolutionary experimental
physicist but not even as a second-rate philosopher.
Nonetheless, his cosmology arises from a philosophical worldview that would dominate Western
thought and, it may be argued, remains with us today in reﬁned but essentially unaltered form.
Descartes’ Epistemological Dualism
Quoting him as writing, “I wished to give myself entirely to the search after truth,” Frederick
Copleston describes Descartes’ fundamental aim
as the attainment of philosophical truth by the use
of reason.16 Likewise, Peter Schouls asserts that for
“Descartes, the greatest need which the philosopher can ﬁll is to do away with insecurity, with lack
of certainty.”17
It may be argued that whereas Galileo did battle
with the scholasticism of the late medieval Church,
Descartes did battle with skepticism. 18 Descartes’
famous method of doubt has one chief end, the attainment of certain knowledge. He believes that
there is only one kind of knowledge and that it is
certain and evident. Unique to Descartes is the
notion that there is only one kind of science based
on that one kind of knowledge and that there can
be only one scientiﬁc method. 19 This one kind of
knowledge is attained by the “light of reason,” and it
stands over against uncertainty, falsehood, and praejudicia: Descartes’ technical term for those opinions
and hypothetical statements that have yet to withstand methodological doubt.
Thus for Descartes, knowledge is certain and
is grounded in reason. The nature of reason is expressed by intuition and deduction. Quoting from
Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of the Mind
Mind, Schouls
writes,
To say that the understanding can acquire knowledge in a way other than through intuition and deduction would be false, for “nothing can be added
to the pure light of reason which does not in some
way obscure it.” Thus it is these “two operations
of our understanding, intuition and deduction, on
which alone...we must rely in the acquisition of our
knowledge.” Intuition and deduction express the
very nature of reason.20

Descartes’ epistemological dualism (e.g., certain

knowledge vs. praejudicia
praejudicia) is consistent with his ontological dualism (res
res cogitans vs. res extensa
extensa). His “one
kind of science” based on his “one kind of knowledge” meant for him that all the natural sciences
could be reduced to physics and that thus the whole
material world could be treated as a mechanical system. This is manifest, for example, in his interpretation of animals as machines and in his rejection
of the need to consider any but efﬁcient causes in
physics. In other words, ﬁnal causality is a theological concern and has no place in physics.21 Thus,
Descartes’ ontological dualism reinforces his epistemological dualism. Further, although Descartes
may not have done so himself, those who followed
him would begin to classify theological knowledge
in one category, with respect to certainty, and scientiﬁc knowledge in another category.
In summary, there is an interesting relationship
between Galileo and Newton, on the one hand, and
between Galileo and Descartes, on the other: where
Newton polished and codiﬁed Galileo’s mechanics,
one might say that Descartes polished and codiﬁed
his epistemology.
Learning from History
What, then, might we learn from this brief exploration of the history of science? It may well be
helpful to remind ourselves of the following: (1) the
modern scientiﬁc worldview has been around for
less than ﬁve hundred years, in comparison to the
two-thousand-year reign of the Aristotelian worldview, and it has experienced signiﬁcant change in
the last hundred years; (2) the absolutization of human knowledge and its equation—at least in some
forms—with divine knowledge by Galileo and the
codiﬁcation of that epistemological absolutism by
Descartes, ought to raise some questions about the
epistemological assumptions we make today.
A BIBLICAL-THEISTIC
STARTING POINT22
In the beginning God created the heavens and the
earth. (Genesis 1:1, NIV)
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was
with God, and the Word was God. He was with
God in the beginning. Through him all things
were made; without him nothing was made that

has been made. (John 1:1-3, NIV)

While these verses provide a good place to start
discussing a Christian view of the conservation-development debate, the doctrine that God created all
things is afﬁrmed and stressed throughout Scripture.
Given that stress, one may state the central idea in
a slightly different form as “the radical distinction
between Creator and creation,” or, expressed negatively, “Nothing God made is God.” 23 Outside of
Scripture, the doctrine is confessed by Christian
churches everywhere when they recite the Apostle’s
Creed: “I believe in God the Father almighty, maker
of heaven and earth.” On the basis of this doctrine
one may deduce the non-self-sufﬁciency and the
referential character of creation.

Thus, everything in creation
refers back to its Creator,
either in accordance with
his will or in some distorted
and disobedient manner.
Only God is eternal,
without beginning, and
wholly self-sufficient.
The Non-self-suﬃciency and
Referential Character of Creation24
Creation, or “nature,” or however else we may
refer to “the known universe and all that it contains,” is not self-sufﬁcient. It was created by God
and is sustained by him. Its existence is wholly dependent on its Creator. Moreover, having no existence “in itself,” its only meaning and purpose can
be, directly or indirectly, to serve its Creator. Thus,
everything in creation refers back to its Creator, either in accordance with his will or in some distorted and disobedient manner. Only God is eternal,
without beginning, and wholly self-sufﬁcient.
The sin of idolatry occurs whenever humankind
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views creation, or some part thereof, as it ought to
view God. In modern expressions of naturalism, for
example, the material world, reduced to atomic and
sub-atomic particles, is considered to be “all that is.”
Matter and energy are believed to be eternal (the
First Law of Thermodynamics as taught to junior
high school students: “matter and energy are neither
created nor destroyed but only changed from one
form to another”). Another example of idolatry
occurs when humankind deiﬁes some part of creation, claiming it to be “sacred” or “holy,” relative
to the rest of creation. This deifying of creation is
the idolatry of ancient pagan or animist cultures. It
can also be the idolatry of modern cultures that circumscribe certain parts of creation, claiming them
to be “off limits” to human interaction, including
inquiry.
The Goodness, Diversity,
and Unity of Creation
God created all things “good.” Whether we
read the creation account in Genesis, the divine poetry of the Psalms, Proverbs and Job, or the words
of the prophets, we are confronted with the unmistakable message that God loves and delights in his
whole creation: lions and dandelions, the birds of
the air and the ﬁsh of the sea, humans created in
his image, mountains, and stars. His expressed love
for and delight in the creation entail the command
that his image-bearing creatures, humankind, are to
love, care for, and delight in that creation as well.
The creation is diverse. There are innumerable
individual creatures that have existed, presently exist, and will exist before Christ returns. Moreover,
there are mind-boggling numbers of “kinds” of
creatures. The command given to Adam to name
the living creatures25 suggests both the ordered
diversity within creation and humankind’s task in
recognizing, respecting, and bringing to verbal expression that diversity.
Notwithstanding this great diversity, there exists
a fundamental unity to creation. All creatures owe
their origin, their continued sustenance, and their
ﬁnal redemption to the Word of God. 26 All share a
common non-self-sufﬁciency and ﬁnitude.
The goodness of creation means that evil is always a distortion of what is good, never a creature27
(or substance) in itself. The diversity of creation
10
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stands over against attempts to reduce creation to
one or two substances, e.g., the matter and energy
of the modern naturalist, Descartes’ thinking substance and material substance, or even those occasions when Christians divide the world dualistically into spiritual and physical realms. The unity
in creation assures us that nothing that exists does
so neutrally or autonomously, apart from the Word
of God calling it into being for service. That unity
also leads to the next critical point: the unity that
human creatures have with the rest of creation.
The Creatureliness of Being Human
God created humankind in his image, as explained in Genesis 1 and Psalm 8. But this imagebearing creature is nonetheless a part of creation,
called into being for service. As image-bearers of the
Creator, humans are given responsibility and (unlike non-human creatures) are thus free to respond
either obediently or disobediently to the Creator.
Human actions are therefore no less natural than
the actions of plants and animals, stars or atoms.
The difference is that human actions are performed
in responsibility and, therefore, can be judged to be
either in service or in disservice to the Creator and
the rest of creation. Human actions should no more
be characterized as “interventions” or “intrusions”
into creation than should the actions of squirrels.
The “natural” course of human actions (“natural”
being deﬁned as “in accordance with God’s will”)
is to assist the rest of creation in ﬂourishing, in being what the Creator calls it to be. The “unnatural” course of human actions (“unnatural” being
deﬁned as “in disobedience to God’s will”) brings
brokenness and distortion to creation.
Being creaturely also means that humans are
ﬁnite. We recognize that ﬁnitude in many ways.
Our physical strength is ﬁnite. Our vision is ﬁnite.
Each day of our lives contains a ﬁnite amount of
time, which itself is part of the created order. In
this post-fall world, the length of our lives is ﬁnite. Considering together the radical distinction
between God, on the one hand, and creation and
the ﬁnitude of humanity, on the other, we are able
to conclude, in a relatively straightforward way, that
our thinking and reasoning ability is ﬁnite and creaturely as well. Reason is something that God created in order to enable his image-bearing creature

to respond to him freely; thus, it is in this matter of
reason that, from a biblical perspective, we must take
issue with Galileo. To equate human knowing with
God’s knowing is to elevate a part of creation to
the position of God—it is to create an idol. Reason
is not God; it is part of creation. It is ﬁnite and
creaturely. When we talk of “God knowing,” we
do so analogically. When God “reasons” with us,28
he does so through his created means, by stooping

Sin and the curse afflict
the whole of creation much
as original sin afflicts all
humankind: it is systemic,
pervasive to the very core of
creation’s being.
to the level of his creature. Science, whether mathematics, quantum mechanics, molecular biology, or
theology, is always ﬁnite and creaturely, characterized by our nature as beings created in the image
of God.
Sadly, there is one more important characteristic of creatureliness which must be recognized.
Genesis 3 tells the story of humankind’s fall into sin
and the consequent curse upon the whole of creation
that followed that fall. Thus, creatureliness in our
post-fall world implies sinfulness and brokenness.
Surely that is the case for God’s image-bearing creatures. However, it is also the case—in a different
way, of course—with the non-human creation. The
“thorns and thistles” of Genesis 3:18 and the “bondage to decay” of Romans 8:21 may be metaphors,
but they are metaphors that point unambiguously
to a creation that suffers under the curse, brought
about by humanity’s sin. Sin and the curse afﬂict
the whole of creation much as original sin afﬂicts all
humankind: it is systemic, pervasive to the very core
of creation’s being.29 Thus science and technology
must work with a creation that is both orderly and
broken. On the one hand, there is much that can be
learned by studying creation.30 On the other hand,

we must be careful not to assume that those parts
of creation not directly affected by humans—as it
were, untouched by human hands—are somehow
pristine, in an ideal state that requires no healing or
warrants no development.
The Relationship Between the Human
and the Non-human Creation
Given this biblical-theistic starting point, can
we begin to articulate an answer to the question of
the relationship between the human and non-human creation? I believe we can if we take into consideration one more important biblical doctrine—a
doctrine sometimes referred to as the “creation
mandate.” In Genesis 1:28, we read the following
regarding the ﬁrst humans:
God blessed them and said to them, “Be fruitful and increase in number; ﬁ ll the earth and subdue it. Rule over the ﬁsh of the sea and the birds of
the air and over every living creature that moves
on the ground.”

This command is re-stated in Genesis 2:15 as
follows:
The LORD God took the man and put him in
the Garden of Eden to work it and take care of it.

This task given to humanity—to develop and
preserve creation—is directly related to our being
created in the image of God. This is stated succinctly in Psalm 8:4-8 (although to understand the word
“ruler,” we need to consult other parts of Scripture
such as the Genesis accounts of creation and those
dealing with God’s covenant with creation):
What is man that you are mindful of him, the
son of man that you care for him? You made him a
little lower than the heavenly beings and crowned
him with glory and honor. You made him ruler
over the works of your hands; you put everything
under his feet: all ﬂocks and herds, and the beasts
of the ﬁeld, the birds of the air, and the ﬁsh of the
sea, all that swim the paths of the seas.31

Humankind, thus, has a unique place in creation.
However, it is too easy to misinterpret that uniqueness to mean “wholly otherness.” One such misinterpretation is to devalue the non-human creation
to the extent that it exists only for the purposes of
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humankind. Stress is then placed on development
to the exclusion of preservation, and humankind
supposes itself free to use (or abuse) the non-human
creation in whatever manner it fancies. Sadly, this
has been the tendency of the Church, under the inﬂuence of a dualistic mentality that values only “the
spiritual” and devalues “the material” as worthless. The other misinterpretation of humankind’s
uniqueness as “wholly other” is to view humanity
as creation’s intruder, who is capable of doing very
little except pillaging creation. In this view, all nonhuman phenomena are considered “natural” while
human actions affecting creation are considered
“artiﬁcial” (the implication being that artiﬁcial is
“unnatural”). The Scriptures, however, countenance no such misinterpretations. In the biblical
narrative and the biblical worldview, humanity is an
integral part of creation. There exists a necessary relationship between the human and the non-human
creation, such that neither can be what it is called by
God to be without the other. Obviously humankind is dependent on the non-human creation for
its very existence. However, the non-human creation depends on humanity as well. It cannot fully
ﬂourish without the cultivation to which humanity
is called by God. This mutual dependence is made
wonderfully clear in a passage from the book of
Ezekiel, where the Lord commands the prophet to
speak to the mountains and hills:
Therefore prophesy concerning the land of
Israel and say to the mountains and hills, to the
ravines and valleys: “This is what the Sovereign
LORD says: I speak in my jealous wrath because you have suffered the scorn of the nations.
Therefore this is what the Sovereign LORD says:
I swear with uplifted hand that the nations around
you will also suffer scorn.
But you, O mountains of Israel, will produce
branches and fruit for my people Israel, for they
will soon come home. I am concerned for you and
will look on you with favor; you will be plowed
and sown, and I will multiply the number of people upon you, even the whole house of Israel. The
towns will be inhabited and the ruins rebuilt. I
will increase the number of men and animals upon
you, and they will be fruitful and become numerous. I will settle people on you as in the past and
will make you prosper more than before. Then

12
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you will know that I am the LORD. I will cause
people, my people Israel, to walk upon you. They
will possess you, and you will be their inheritance;
you will never again deprive them of their children.” 32

The message here is straightforward: the mountains and hills prosper when they serve as the inheritance of God’s people. Likewise, God’s people
can be fruitful only in mutual dependence with
those mountains and hills. Thus the relationship
between the human and non-human creation is one
of interdependence. While the non-human creation
provides God’s image-bearers with food, clothing,
shelter, and the very materials out of which their
bodies are made, God’s image-bearers serve the
non-human creation by enabling it to ﬂourish.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL HUMILITY
You asked, “Who is this that obscures my counsel
without knowledge?” Surely I spoke of things I
did not understand, things too wonderful for me
to know. (Job 42:3, NIV )

Job learned epistemological humility the hard
way. From the ash heap of his wrecked life, he came
to understand what the prophet Isaiah knew when
he wrote,
“My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are
your ways may ways,” declares the LORD. “As
the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my
ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than
your thoughts.” (Isaiah 55:8-9, NIV )

By “epistemological humility,” I want to suggest
a posture of appropriate servanthood and creatureliness with respect to our relationship with God
and the non-human creation, particularly in terms
of how we know the latter. To know—in the fullest sense of that word—is a peculiarly human and,
hence, a distinctly creaturely activity. As mentioned
earlier, to speak of God “knowing” is to speak analogically and legitimately as image-bearing creatures
of God. Human knowing, even rational knowing,
is never absolute. Thus certainty never has the absolute character that Galileo ascribed to mathematics or that Descartes ascribed to deduction.
Knowledge is multi-dimensional. For example,

if a teacher drops a chunk of iron sulﬁde into a small
beaker of hydrochloric acid in the midst of class of
high school sophomores, they will break out in giggles because they “know” that distinctively biotic
odor. They haven’t had chemistry yet, so they don’t
“know” hydrogen sulﬁde in the same way that the
upperclassmen who have been through chemistry
lab know hydrogen sulﬁde. Rather, they know it
“sensitively.” Although there are surely elements of
reason involved in their knowledge, those sophomores know hydrogen sulﬁde gas primarily by
means of their sense of smell.
There are other modes of knowing beside the
rational and the sensitive. Perhaps the one we tend
to overlook most easily is faith knowledge. When
we recite the Apostle’s Creed, we begin by saying, “I
believe.” The knowledge content of the Apostle’s
Creed certainly has a rational side, but it is, ﬁrst and
foremost, faith knowledge. What we too often fail
to see is that faith knowledge is also fundamental to
our work in science. In order for us to proceed in
science, we must trust that the scientiﬁc method is
valid, that there is indeed a dependable lawfulness
behind the regularities we observe in nature, and
that the relationship between our thinking abilities
and those regularities outside ourselves provide us
faithfully, even if only provisionally, with insight
into the behavior we observe.
This is perhaps a good place to summarize a
major thesis of this paper. Given that we are creatures and not the Creator, and on the evidence provided by the history of science—particularly when
we see the historic roles played by the Aristotelian,
Newtonian, modern worldviews in the development of scientiﬁc thought—we must conclude that
scientiﬁc knowledge will always be ﬁnite and tentative, never absolute. Thus, an attitude of epistemological humility ought to characterize our work in
science and technology.
From an attitude of epistemological humility,
we will want to question the basic assumptions of
naturalism. Why should causality be exclusively
physical causality? Certainly this is the way we have
experienced nature during the last four hundred or
so years. However, it is not an attitude common to
humanity across the world and throughout recorded
history. Furthermore, why should the explanation
of all our experience be reducible to what we have

come to call the laws of physics? Might it not be because we have absolutized both our understanding
of physical law and human understanding itself?
From an attitude of epistemological humility
we will certainly reject the hubris of technicism.
Ray Kurzweil’s notions of immortality based on
increasing technological development are rooted
in the contradictory notions that, on the one hand,
human understanding is unlimited and that, on
the other hand, humans are nothing more than

While the non-human
creation provides God’s
image-bearers with food,
clothing, shelter, and the
very materials out of which
their bodies are made,
God’s image-bearers serve
the non-human creation by
enabling it to flourish.
evolving centers of matter, energy, and information. Epistemological humility will not curtail our
imagining of future technological developments,
but it will certainly persuade us of the foolishness
of technological triumphalism. Science ﬁction can
play a healthy role in the technological imagination,
as long as it remains science “ﬁction.”
We will also reject bio-romanticism: the notion
that what we understand as the non-human creation
is somehow perfect and that it is we humans who
are the sole cause of all brokenness in the world.
Interestingly this notion rests upon the naturalistic
assumptions that all causality is physical causality
and that human knowledge of the non-human creation is valid in an absolute sense. It also rests upon
the assumption that there is something about human
beings that makes them “un-natural.” If one probes
those assumptions a bit, one comes to the conclusion that for William Wordsworth 33 or for ardent
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followers of PETA, 34 bio-romantic inclinations are
rooted in a commitment to the autonomy of human
thought, not unlike that expressed by Galileo and
Descartes. Thus epistemological humility calls into
question the naturalism of physical reductionists as
well as the naturalism of bio-romanticists.
Epistemological humility, however, will embrace
the notion of servanthood. By rejecting the kind
of absolute certainty that Galileo and Descartes
claimed for human knowledge, we come to recognize our own creatureliness and our dependence on
the One who created us. We are thereby enabled to
take up our role as servants of our Creator, of each
other, and of the non-human creation.
EGBERT SCHUURMAN’S PHILOSOPHY
OF TECHNOLOGY
Returning to the questions of the relationship
of the human to the non-human creation and the
apparent tension between development and conservation, we ﬁnd that an examination of the philosophy of technology developed by Egbert Schuurman
can be most helpful. In particular, Schuurman
uses the concept of “meaning disclosure” to get
at the essence of obedient technological development and to distinguish it from technicism, understood as technological development for its own
sake. Schuurman’s recent book, Faith and Hope in
Technolog y, published in 2003, is most helpful because it addresses in particular the concerns raised
by biotechnology. A more complete discussion of
the concept of “meaning disclosure,” however, is
found in his earlier work, Technolog y and the Future
published in 1980. 35
Schuurman argues that creation is more than
just the physical and the biotic. Human functioning
gives clear evidence of dimensions beyond the physical and biotic, dimensions such as the historical, social, lingual, as well as the dimension of faith, just
to name a few. However, Schuurman argues also
for the participation of the non-human creation in
these post-biotic dimensions. 36 For example, just as
humans cannot be fully human (cannot even exist!)
without the physical and biotic sides to their integral
selves, the non-human creation requires the service of human beings for the full expression of its
multifaceted wholeness. This service occurs when
humans interact with the non-human creation, en14
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abling the non-human creation to ﬂourish in ways
otherwise impossible.
Recall the prophecy of Ezekiel 36. The land
ﬂourishes when God brings his people back to it,
when the ruins are rebuilt, and people and animals
are once more thriving “in the land.” The unity and
interdependency evidenced in that prophetic vision
are what guide Schuurman’s view of technology.
When humans engage in technology obediently, according to God’s normative Word, then creation is
opened up, its post-biotic dimensions are disclosed,
and it gloriﬁes its Creator in new ways. Of course,
when humans engage in technology disobediently,
in opposition to God’s normative Word, then the
non-human creation is distorted, and its capacity for
glorifying its Creator is diminished.
A second key element in Schuurman’s philosophy of technology is his careful distinction between
science and technology. Both involve meaning disclosure. However, science is seeking to understand
creation by analysis, that is, by means of logical abstraction. In physics, for example, we separate the
irreducibly physical characteristics of a given phenomenon from its other characteristics in order to
better understand that abstracted physical aspect.
Technology, on the other hand, discloses meaning
in a different way. Instead of seeking to understand
what is already there, technology seeks to bring into
being what exists only in potential. The method of
technology is likewise different from the method
of science. Rather than dealing with abstractions
from our experience of reality, technology deals
with reality in its wholeness. A signiﬁcant part of
Schuurman’s critique of technicism is that it focuses
on technological problems as if they were scientiﬁc
problems, examining only aspects of a situation, detached from the context of the whole.
A third key element in Schuurman’s philosophy
of technology is his careful distinction between
physical and biotic meaning and his warning, with
regard to biotechnology, that we heed this distinction.37 Modern technology, up until the present
time, has dealt overwhelmingly with physical phenomena. Only recently has biotechnology signiﬁcantly altered that emphasis. However, physical
technology must concern itself with the laws for
physical subjects. One of the most important of
those laws is what we have come to call the Second

Law of Thermo-dynamics. It states that for closed
systems and in all physical processes, the tendency
is always to move in the direction of uniformity and
randomness. In physical processes involving energy transformation, for example, the Second Law
states that some energy will always be dissipated as
low-level thermal energy, the random motion of the
mass particles of a system. This characteristic of
physical things is a primary factor in all physical
technology. Any and all design that seeks to transform the physical must cope with the Second Law
of Thermodynamics.

When humans engage
in technology obediently,
according to God’s
normative Word, then
creation is opened up, its
post-biotic dimensions are
disclosed, and it glorifies
its Creator in new ways.
Of course, when humans
engage in technology
disobediently, in opposition
to God’s normative Word,
then the non-human
creation is distorted, and
its capacity for glorifying its
Creator is diminished.
Biotic meaning, however, is different. Despite
having a physical dimension and therefore also being subject to the Second Law, living things are subject to biotic laws that transcend and are irreducible to physical law. In part, this biotic lawfulness
may be stated as “autonomous procreation and the

preservation of the whole despite the continuous
change of its parts.”38 Let us use the term “biotic
ﬂourishing” to connote these characteristics as well
as some others that help us distinguish living things
from physical things. Biotic ﬂourishing leads living things in the direction of higher complexity and
increased differentiation. The Lord makes use of
this characteristic of living things in his mustard
seed metaphor: “Though it is the smallest of all your
seeds, yet when it grows, it is the largest of garden
plants and becomes a tree, so that the birds of the
air come and perch in its branches.” 39 Of course, the
language of the creation mandate contains, in part,
the same language used to direct all living things:
“Be fruitful and increase in number.” 40
The key point here is not only that the Second
Law of Thermodynamics and biotic ﬂourishing
distinguish, respectively, physical things and living
things but also that these two general laws direct their
respective creatures oppositely. All physical things are
subject to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. All
living things—which are also physical—are subject to the law for biotic ﬂourishing as well as the
Second Law of Thermodynamics. Schuurman puts
it this way:
The difference between the technology of the
inorganic and the technology of the organic becomes clear when we note the different laws which
apply to the two domains. In inorganic nature everything tends in the direction of leveling. …In
the world of living things, however, we witness a
process of increasing differentiation.41

If in our minds we reduce living things to physical
things, if we believe that biological activity is merely
an expression of physical law, we will approach biotechnology with the same tools, procedures, and attitudes with which we approach physical technology.
Doing so may have dire consequences.
Consider that since the Industrial Revolution—
the period of history that has given expression to
“modern technology”—technological initiatives
have had chieﬂy to contend with physical law such
as the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Thus, the
tools, procedures, and attitudes of modern technology are those associated with physical technology,
developed in the course of dealing with the tendency of things to move in the direction of randomPro Rege—March 2007
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ness, uniformity, and leveling—the tendencies of
processes to slow down and stop. On only relatively
rare occasions has modern technology had to deal
with ﬂourishing as a problem. Those problems have
largely had to do with the transplantation of species
of living things from their native habitat to one that
enabled reproduction to occur in an uncontrolled
and proﬂigate manner (e.g., rabbits in Australia;
gypsy moths, Africanized bees, and carp in the
United States 42). In physical technology, problems
of proﬂigacy are never truly physical but always social in nature, 43 for example, the proliferation of
automobiles and the resulting social and environmental degradation.
The posture of modern technology has thus
been established by the technology of the physical.
If we take a reductionistic approach to living things,
seeing them as nothing but complicated expressions
of physical law, we will have no inclination to alter
that posture as we engage in biotechnology. The
result will be our unpreparedness to deal with problems such as biotic proﬂigacy, problems associated
with the response of living things to distinctively
biotic laws.
Edward Tenner, in his book Why Things Bite Back:
Technolog y and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences
Consequences, describes the kind of technological problems that can
occur when the whole is mistaken for the sum of
its parts, as when a living thing is mistaken for a
series of complex chemical reactions. He calls these
technological problems “revenge effects,” in order
to distinguish them from “side effects” and tradeoffs—two kinds of technological problems that are
more clearly understood.44 Revenge effects are not
conﬁned to biotechnology. Revenge effects in information technology are legion. One has only to
consider how the “blessing” of e-mail has induced
the “curse” of spam. However, revenge effects in
biotechnology are both precipitated and aggravated
by those characteristics of living things that are not
reducible to physical systems, e.g., ﬂourishing.
STEWARDSHIP: BOTH BIOTECHNOLOGY
AND CREATION CARE
A Story of Buﬀalos and Chimney Pots
Early on a snowy Sunday morning some time
ago, I sat in the enclosed porch on the back of my
16
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house and watched the sky slowly brighten. The
softly falling snow obscured the sunrise, but the
view to the east and south was nonetheless beautiful. I had enclosed the porch the previous summer;
and with ﬂoor-to-ceiling windows enveloping more
than half the room, a gas-ﬁred stove for heat, carpet on the ﬂoor, and a comfortable reading chair in
which to sit, the new room provides a way of experiencing the outdoors while maintaining indoor
comfort. Since I live on a ridge on the Iowa prairie,
on a clear day I am able to see many miles toward
the distance horizon, despite the presence of the
surrounding houses that constitute the suburban
development of which my house is one part. For
example, the water tower in the next town, twelve
miles to the southeast, is often striking in its round,
orange visibility.
On this particular morning, however, the obscuring quality of the lightly falling snow focused
my attention on what once was the surrounding
prairie. I tried imagining what the scene was like a
hundred years ago, with the rolling hills dominated
by prairie grass—and perhaps a herd of buffalo
nearby. It was then that I was tempted to wish away
the other houses, streets, lampposts, and other signs
of civilization so that I could glimpse the natural,
unadulterated prairie. Notice I said “tempted.” I
couldn’t really bring myself to wish away those artifacts of civilization because I believe that houses,
streets, and lampposts are just as “natural” as the
prairie grass. They are simply a different kind of nature—cultural nature, if you will. As an engineer, I
am someone who believes ﬁrmly that the Lord has
called us to unfold and develop the creation, bringing forth creatures (like houses, streets, and lampposts) that exist only in potential until humankind’s
response to the creation mandate brings them into
being.
Still, on this particular morning I was torn. I
had developed a sense of empathy for my Dordt colleagues in the life sciences for whom, it sometimes
seems, the only truly beautiful landscape is one that
shows no inﬂuence of technology. I yearned to see
the pristine prairie grass bending slightly under the
weight of lightly falling snow, the playful scurrying
of prairie dogs, and the slow-moving buffalo as the
snow creates a cloak of white on their woolly and
dark- brown backs.

Then, however, I realized that I had seen all
these things before. In fact, the imaginative longing
that stirred within me that snowy Sunday morning
could never have occurred had I not already been
acquainted with those denizens of God’s good creation. I remembered the ﬁlm The Vanishing Prairie
Prairie,
which was produced by Walt Disney back when I
was a child in the 1950s. I also remembered more
recent real life experiences of these prairie creatures
in Blue Mounds, Minnesota, and in Custer National
Park in South Dakota. It was these memories, coexisting with the scene before me, that helped create
that yearning for a more pristine scene, a yearning
that seemed somehow out of synch with my appreciation for technology.
After a few more moments of musing, however,
it occurred to me that I have other memories with
the power to create other imaginative longings for
very different vistas. In particular, I recalled traveling with my wife two years ago to England. One
of the cities that we visited was York, a place whose
medieval personality is preserved in the layout of the
streets, the character if the buildings, and especially
the ancient wall that surrounds the city. Many of
the older cities in England were walled cities, built
in early medieval times with the need for protection
from less-civilized neighbors. The wall in York is
the best preserved of all these cities, and an ambitious visitor can walk atop the wall, almost completely around the city, in just a few hours. One vantage point on the wall offers an exquisitely beautiful
view of the York Minster Cathedral of St. Peter, one
of England’s largest and oldest churches, completed
in the year 1470, after two hundred and ﬁfty years of
construction. The sight I remember best, however,
occurred when we stood atop the wall and looked
outward from the city center toward the surrounding
suburbs. Of course, this being England, the “suburbs” of York were developed during the nineteenth
century and so represent the Victorian era, the time
in which Charles Dickens lived and about which he
wrote in his many novels and stories. What struck
me most about that view were the ubiquitous earthenware chimney pots that punctuated the horizon,
telling of a time when the hundreds of aged houses
were heated by ﬁreplaces that burned wood or coal.
Thinking about that view from the wall in York,
and contrasting it with the view from my enclosed

porch, I realized that the vision of Victorian society
suggested by the one, and the vision of prairie grass
and buffalo suggested by the other, are both beautiful, God-glorifying, and very much natural in their
own way. The tension between biotic nature, on
the one hand, and cultural nature, on the other, is
a false tension and was here resolved for me by my
recalling the aesthetic experiences of viewing the
once-upon-a-time, prairie-grass-dominated horizon
from my enclosed porch, and the Victorian suburbs
of Northern England from the wall in York. Truly,
as the writer of Ecclesiastes has told us, God “has
made everything beautiful in its time.”45
Conclusion
The tension between biotechnology and creation care, between development and conservation,
is a false one. We are called by our Creator to be
stewards of his good creation, caring for it both by
bringing healing and helping it ﬂourish. By adopting a posture of epistemological humility, we will be
prone neither to abuse the non-human creation nor
to set it on a pedestal out of reach. Rather, we will
see ourselves as one part of creation—the part that
has responsibility for the wellbeing of the whole. We
will see our knowledge as ﬁnite and affected by sin,
and we will see our artifacts—including biotechnological artifacts—as the products of that ﬁnite and
fallible knowledge. When produced with care, they
will have as much natural place as the ﬂowers of
the ﬁelds and the birds of the air. For they will be
evidence of the unity in nature: “cultural nature”
arising from “biotic nature.”
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